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Abstract
This paper develops and estimates a model of market conduct in the US
banking industry during the 1990s. Competition in both output and factor
markets is measured in a static Cournot model in the spirit of Bresnahan
(1989), Shaer (1991,1994a), Neven and R oller (1997), and others. Banks
can exert market power in loans as well as in deposit markets. Previous
studies on banking competition center on the structure conduct hypothesis,
where reduced form models with market concentration measures are used to
estimate the degree of competition. We consider a disaggregated structural
model of bank loan markets, where bank's competitive behavior is measured
in input and output markets. Our results indicate that the standard model
which measures only output market behavior is potentially biased.
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Banking competition has been a topic of considerable interest, especially
since the early 1980s, when deposit rates were deregulated and banks were
able to pay interest on demand deposits. The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 al-
lowed banks to branch beyond state boundaries, opening the door to in-
terstate branching. Banks continue to move into nontraditional markets
while nonbanks are oering banking services as well as changing the notion
of what services a bank provides. The banking industry clearly is going
through substantial changes in structure and competition. Mergers, failures
and entry have resulted in a net decline in the number of banks from some
14,500 in 1980 to around 9,000 in 1996. These changes in banking indus-
try structure and competitive environment have fueled a large literature on
banking competition and productivity.
Currently, two distinct methods of analysis in banking markets are ap-
plied by the Federal Reserve and the Department of Justice. On the one
hand, the Federal Reserve uses a cluster market approach, where banking
services are considered jointly as a cluster of products.1 Under this method-
ology, all banking products are bundled together, since consumers tend to
purchase several services such as retail services, loans, and deposits from a
single bank. Banking markets dened with the cluster approach are gen-
erally large and include other nancial institutions such as thrifts because
of their provision of many bank services.2. On the other hand, the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) applies the smallest market principle detailed in the
Merger Guidelines promulgated by the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). In the smallest market principle, a product or geographic market is
dened by the ability of a hypothetical monopolist to impose a \small but
signicant and non transitory" price increase.3 The resulting analysis cen-
ters on separate loan and deposit markets with relatively small geographic
markets and limited scope. Small business and middle market lending are
typically markets of concern in DOJ analysis. Other nancial institutions
are included in the analysis only if they represent a signicant competitor
in the individual markets.
Our study of banking competition shows evidence that the smallest mar-
ket principle might be the more relevant methodology in banking. We extend
1The Federal Reserve often cites the Supreme Court decision of United States versus
Philadelphia National Bank from 1963, which denes geographic markets in banking.
2Thrifts are often included in market calculations at 50% of deposits
3See Merger Guidelines (1997) pg. 4.
1the literature by developing a disaggregated structural model of banking
competition where banks can exert market power not only in separate loan
markets, but also in deposit markets (where they act as potential monopson-
ists). Results from models of banking competition that do not disaggregate
loan markets or that do not allow for monopsony power in inputs are poten-
tially biased. To illustrate the dierence in results, we compare our model
to a more traditional model of banking competition, which does not include
monopsony power in input markets.
We consider three dierent loan categories as specied in the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) call reports: commercial and industrial
loans provided to businesses; installment loans provided to individuals; and
real estate loans, which are loans secured by real estate. It is our contention
that these dierent loan types represent dierent product markets because
consumers are typically not able to substitute one loan type for another.
Hence, relative price changes in one type of loan do not lead to substitution
into another loan type. Also, banks are able to price dierentiate between
customers of each type of loan. Prices are changed according to the mar-
ket conditions in a specic loan market.4 The Merger Guidelines determine
product markets along these lines.5
Quantifying market behavior and productivity in the banking industry
is still an elusive topic primarily since the appropriate data are not available.
In addition, diculties exist in dening inputs and outputs and in measuring
prices. Because of these diculties, a substantial part of the bank compe-
tition research has centered on the structure-conduct-performance relation-
ship and, until recently, the ecient-structure hypothesis.6 The structure-
conduct-performance hypothesis posits higher prots in more concentrated
markets from the exercise of market power. Conversely, the ecient-structure
hypothesis7 gives a dierent explanation by attributing higher prots and
market concentration to higher rm eciency. Authors typically consider
4Of course, common cost elements exist between the markets such as cost of federal
funds and discount funds, but it is the demand side and risk that dier dramatically in
these markets.
5Banking is not specically mentioned in the Merger Guidelines, but product and geo-
graphic market denitions are detailed. One limitation of our results concerns geographic
market denition. Because of data restrictions (banks report to FDIC only at the state
level), we are not able to more narrowly dene geographic markets. This overstatement
of geographic markets means that our estimates are potentially downward biased. Hence,
competitive concerns could be understated by our model.
6See Berger and Hannon (1989, 1995) and Berger (1995).
7See Demsetz (1973).
2the eect of market concentration on prices and/or protability. Market
concentration in banking is typically measured in terms of total deposits.8
Most studies use deposit interest rates as a measure of price or some measure
of protability such as return on assets or return on equity in their analysis.
The relationship of market concentration{price analyses and Cournot models
is well known.9 Several studies of banking competition use the market con-
centration methodology. Gilbert (1984) surveys the previous literature on
banking competition spanning two decades and nds a positive relationship
between market share and prots. Others such as Berger (1995), Berger
and Hannon (1989, 1991, 1997), and Hannon (1991, 1997) test both the
market power and eciency hypotheses in US banking. Berger and Hannon
(1989) examine the relevance of concentration on deposit rates after dereg-
ulation in the 1980s. In a subsequent study (Berger and Hannon, 1991),
they nd asymmetric adjustment of deposit rates to Treasury Bill rates in
concentrated markets, where banks in more concentrated markets decrease
deposit rates in periods of declining overall rates more quickly than they
increase them during periods of increasing interest rates. Hannon (1991,
1997) links local market concentration to higher rates on dierent classes
of small commercial loans. This evidence might give rise to the notion
that perfect competition equilibrium is not maintained in the US banking
industry. On the other hand, Berger (1995) nds support for the ecient-
structure hypothesis, where market concentration is associated with higher
bank eciency.
Market concentration studies lend themselves to competition analysis
for several reasons. First, deposit data (by branch on a yearly basis) are
readily available and can be used easily to determine market share for a
relatively small sized geographic market. Second, Federal Reserve and DOJ
antitrust merger analysis uses Herndahl{Hirschman Index (HHI) market
concentration measures10 derived from deposit shares as an initial screen to
determine the possible eects of a bank merger.11 Threshold values of the
8The Federal Reserve and Department of Justice Antitrust Division use market con-
centration measured by deposits using FDIC data and recently by loans using CRA data.
9See Cowling and Waterson (1976) and Dansby and Willig (1979) as well as Farrell
and Shapiro (1990) for a discussion of the HHI in Cournot equilibrium.
10The HHI is dened as the sum of squared market shares. Market shares are typically
derived from deposits, because it is assumed that the level of a bank's deposits in a market
is an indication of the level of its other banking services in that same market.
11There are some dierences between the Federal Reserve and DOJ methods. First,
DOJ does not include thrifts in its market share calculations, while the Fed typically
includes them at 50%: Second, geographic market denitions dier. The Federal Reserve
3HHI which warrant competitive concern include a HHI level of 1800 and a
change in HHI of 200. Once these bounds are exceeded, the Fed and DOJ
consider other factors such as entry and market growth to determine if ac-
tion is necessary. Because the merger analysis relies on HHI measures of
concentration, it is important to understand the relationship between prices
or competition and concentration. Hence, studies that examine this rela-
tionship are directly relevant to competition policy. Furthermore, deposit
shares are essentially used as a proxy for other types of banking services
such as loans, cash management, underwriting, etc.. Since loan data are not
as readily available as deposit data, both agencies rely on the latter for their
competitive analysis.12
In his survey Gilbert (1984) notes that the analysis of banking compe-
tition has relied on reduced form models (such as the market concentration
studies), and he advises that future work should concentrate on structural
models for measuring market conduct. Other authors have followed this
line of research and have introduced structural models of banking com-
petition using the methods derived by Panzar and Rosse (1979), Panzar,
Rosse, and Willig (1982) and Bresnahan (1982). Bresnahan (1982) develops
a method of testing competitive behavior in industries, where demand equa-
tions are jointly estimated with marginal cost equations. These methods are
also outlined in his Handbook of Industrial Organization chapter (Bresna-
han, 1989) and have been applied to the banking industry by Shaer (1989,
1993, 1994a,b), Hannan and Liang (1993), Suominen (1994), Molyneux et
al. (1992) and Berg and Kim (1995). Most studies, particularly those using
US data, have found little evidence of market power at the overall bank
level. Suominen (1994) estimates the competitive behavior for two separate
markets, aggregated loan and deposit markets. His study nds mixed re-
sults on the market behavior of Finnish banks. Berg and Kim (1995) use
an index of loans to estimate a single parameter for market behavior for all
outputs. Their model stresses the endogeneity of outputs and rm behav-
ior in productivity measurement. These studies are all based on a static
Cournot equilibrium. Most of these studies nd no or little anticompetitive
market behavior. However, almost all of them aggregate loan outputs into
tends to use MSAs to determine geographic markets, and the DOJ denes markets much
more narrowly. Third, the Fed considers a bundle of banking services, while the DOJ
analyzes each market individually. Hence, the DOJ considers retail banking services and
individual loan markets separately.
12The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) data contains detailed loan information.
One signicant caveat of the data is its complete lack of price information.
4a single index. Since loan markets are very dierent in nature, this aggrega-
tion could complicate any inference on competition in the banking industry.
Furthermore, these studies only consider market behavior in output mar-
kets. We nd that this results in an upward bias in the market behavior
parameters.13
This paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 discusses
our model of banking competition. Section 3 describes the data and section
4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We use a model of a static Cournot game to develop a structural model
of oligopoly behavior. We use a standard model of prot maximization,
where banks sell loans to consumers and demand loanable funds represented
by deposits.14 It is well known that deposits could also represent banking
retail services (an output) to customers. However, our aim is to determine if
banks are paying competitive rates for deposits. In order to measure market
monopsony power, we model retail time and savings deposits as inputs and
demand deposits as outputs to indicate the level of nancial services.15 Our
model is not only able to determine market behavior in output markets,
but also possible monopsonist behavior in input markets. Specically, we
ask whether banks are able to increase the price of a loan and decrease the
interest paid on deposits.
We start our formulation of the model by specifying the demand equa-





j is the price of loan j, Lj is the quantity of loan j, and Z represents





13Shaer (1994a) discusses the source of this bias.
14This specication is similar to that of Neven and R oller (1997)
15Note that this distinction could be considered arbitrary. Our results are robust to the
input/output specication of demand deposits.
5where rd
i is the price of deposit i, Di is the quantity of retail time and
savings deposits, and Z represents exogenous demand determinants.16 Given
product demand, we consider a representative bank n that produces loans






























j is the price for loan type j, lj is the amount of loans for loan
type j for bank b, di is the amount of deposits for deposit type i for bank
b, rd
i is the price of retail time and savings deposits, and C(.) is the cost
function, where costs are a function of the loan and deposit quantities. Given
demand and cost specications, we can write the rst order conditions for
the Cournot solution, where banks are oering loans on the one hand and
demanding deposits on the other and banks have possible market power in
deposit market i, assuming competitive market behavior in other deposit
markets. Substitute in d1 =
P3















d2   MCd2 = 0
where MC is marginal cost with respect to loan j, and j and  measure
the degree of competition. These parameters represent the price eect that
a rm takes into account when it chooses its level of outputs and inputs.
In output markets at the rm level, if j = 0, price equals marginal cost
and the industry is perfectly competitive, while j = 1 is consistent with
Cournot Nash behavior. Collusive (or monopoly) behavior occurs when
16The exogenous variables are the same across all demand variables, since they are
variables that indicate overall interest rate level such as federal fund or treasury bill rates
or that indicate a shift such as population and income.
6j = N. In factor markets, when  = 0, factor price equals marginal
revenue product (less marginal costs) and the factor market is perfectly
competitive. When  = 1, we observe Cournot Nash behavior. Collusive
(or monopsony) behavior is observed when  = N, indicating that factor
prices are less than marginal revenue product.
In order to estimate this system of equations, we make functional form
assumptions for marginal costs and the demand and supply functions. We
derive marginal costs from a translog cost function. The marginal costs
are then imbedded in the rst order conditions. We also assume semilog
functional form of loan and deposit demand:
lnrl
j = dj0 + dj1 lj + dj2 Pop + dj3Tbill + dj4Disc
+ dj5Income + 1j for j = 1;2;3 (3)
lnrd
2 = s0 + s1 d2 + s2 Pop + s3Tbill + s4Disc + s5Income + 2 (4)
where Pop is the population, Tbill is 3 month Treasury Bill rate, Disc is
the discount rate, and Income in each specic state where a bank is located.
Using these functional form assumptions and including error terms, we get



























These four behavioral equations are estimated jointly with loan demand
equations and the deposit demand equations.
3 Data
We use a panel data set of around 70 U.S. commercial banks in California
followed quarterly for the 7{year period from 1990 through 1997. The data
are taken from the Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) and FDIC
Summary of Deposits. In order to capture a single banking market, we
7consider banks in California only. The banking markets are more than likely
smaller than the entire state. However, the data are collected at the bank
level. Before Riegle-Neal Act, all banks were conned to states' borders.
Data on smaller geographic markets are typically inputed in some manner
from the state level data. We do not parse the data into smaller geographic
markets.
Prices are imputed from loan and deposit revenues, where interest and
fee income from loans in each category are divided by total loans17 in each
loan type. While this measure of loan prices is not optimal, we are essentially
measuring revenue for each dollar loaned. These imputed prices represent
an average for each bank. Deposit loan prices represent average amount
paid per dollar of deposit received. All dollar gures are in thousands of
1982-84 dollars. We have deleted any observations with zero values to avoid
measurement problems and boundary problems associated with logarithmic
values. The resulting data set contains 1983 observations with 154 banks in
California.
The variables in our data include: Pre preln = Price of Real Estate
Loans, Pci pciln = Price of Commercial and Industrial Loans, Pin pinln =
Price of Installment Loans, Y = reln (real estate loans), ciln (commercial
and industrial loans), inln (installment loans), dd = Demand Deposits; X =




We estimated equations 3 { 6 using iterated nonlinear three stage least
squares. Tables (1), (2) and (3) show the results for the demand and supply
equations and the rst order equations (See demand equations 3 and 4 and
the behavioral equations 5 and 6).
We rst turn to the demand estimation results. the own price coecients
for all loan types are negative as expected. Demand elasticities measured at
the mean of the data range for -10.62, -2.09, to -1.29 for real estate, com-
mercial and industrial, and installment loans respectively. Average elasticity
results in somewhat dierent levels ranging from -11.60, -1.89, to -1.10. Loan
17Net of allowance and reserves.
18Purchased funds include federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements
to repurchase and demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury and other borrowed money,
as well as other borrowed money and deposits which are not demand deposits and retail
time and savings deposits.
8demand seems to be negatively correlated with 3 month Treasury Bill rates
and positively correlated with discount rates and income. These results are
consistent across all loan types.19 However, the own price coecients are
dierent enough to warrant disaggregating loan markets. Marginal costs for
all outputs are correctly positive.
The results on the loan and deposit market behavioral parameters are
located in Table (2). The market parameter for all loan types are all sig-
nicantly dierent from 0 and are greater than 1. Interesting enough, we
nd that the values of  for commercial and industrial loans and real estate
loans are high in magnitude, with values of 22.16 and 61.99. The installment
market parameter estimate lies at 7.21, somewhat smaller in magnitude and
is also signicantly dierent from 1 at the 1% level. We also test noncooper-
ative Nash behavior and nd that the values of  are signicantly dierent
from 1 at the 1% level. These estimates indicate that market behavior in
these loan markets is not very competitive. The higher parameter estimate
in real estate markets is particularly interesting because of the existence of
other competitors such as mortgage lending companies. Such nancial insti-
tutions are not prevalent in commercial and industrial loan markets, where
banks are the primary providers of such credit.
Estimation of the model using data from other states exhibits similar re-
sults with slight variations in the magnitudes, but the same overall trends.
However, results using data from all states or from groups of states dier
dramatically than those for individual states. Market behavior coecients
are much lower in magnitude and seem to indicate a fairly competitive mar-
ket. However, since the market behavior parameters increase signicantly
as the geographic markets become more localized, we nd that the data
support at the most a state level geographic market and most likely a more
conning geographic market.20
Commercial and industrial loans, especially small business (loans up to
$1;000;000) and middle market loans (loans up to$10;000;000), are of con-
siderable interest in the antitrust analysis of DOJ. This is because small
businesses typically do not want travel very far to obtain credit. They rely
on the banks with branches close to them, because of their close proximity
and also because these banks are able to obtain more information about the
small business. This additional information allows the banks to better judge
19Except for installment loans, where the discount rate shows an insignicant negative
coecient
20Since the data are collected at the state level, it is dicult to obtain data for more
local markets without using some form of imputation.
9the risk of the local small business. Hence, the propensity for market power
is larger, because competition in small business markets is localized.21 Un-
fortunately, we are unable to separate out the data for these loan markets
and for smaller geographic areas. However, our results indicate that these
antitrust concerns are warranted, since the parameter estimates point to a
noncompetitive equilibrium.
Interestingly enough, the deposit market coecient seems to exhibit a
value of 22.13. This coecient is signicantly dierent from 0 (at the 1%
level) and signicantly dierent from Nash behavior. This result is surpris-
ing since a wide variety of nancial institutions oer a variety of similar
products with varying levels of return and liquidity that compete directly
with savings deposits. More importantly, many types of nancial institu-
tions such as savings and loans associations and credit unions exist that
oer the same product as commercial banks. While these nancial insti-
tutions are not included in our data, they don't seem to exert competitive
restraints on banks to lower deposit rates below competitive levels. These
restraints do not apply in commercial and industrial lending, since these
nancial institutions tend not to lend in those markets.
The estimated mark-ups for the loan markets were , 0.84, 1.52, and
0.81 percentage points respectively for real estate loans, commercial and
industrial loans, and installment loans. These mark-ups represent a relative
mark-up to the mean price for each loan of 15%, 24%, and 11% respectively.
Estimated mark-down in retail time and savings markets is 0.73 percentage
points or 22%.
Finally, to check the robustness of our results and to illustrate the possi-
ble bias of simpler models, which do not account for monopsony power, we
estimated another model, where no monopsony power is measured ( = 0).
The results are located in table (3). This model resulted in signicantly dif-
ferent measures of market behavior. Estimated market behavior parameters
are 126.22, 26.53, and 15.89 for real estate loans, commercial and industrial
loans, and installment loans respectively. Notice that all estimated behav-
ioral parameters are signicantly larger in magnitude.22 The simple model
indicates that markups above marginal costs are signicantly greater than
in the more complex model.
Shaer (1994a) shows that a model, which does not account for monop-
21See Rhoades (1996) for a discussion of small business loans in antitrust analysis.
22While the market behavior parameter for real estate loans is signicantly larger than
in the more complex model, it is also insignicant.
10sony power, will result in an upward bias in the market behavior parameters.
A model which does not account for monopsony power in input markets will
attribute all market power to the output markets. Our results reveal this
apparent bias in simple models of competition (i.e. models which do not
account for monopsony power).
5 Conclusion
This paper introduces a structural model of banking competition that mea-
sures the Nash behavior of banks in output (loans) and input (deposits)
markets. Our results parallel those in other studies which use the structure{
conduct{performance and the ecient{structure{hypothesis (Berger, 1995)
methodologies as well as the \new empirical industrial organization" models
of Shaer (1989, 1993,1994a,b) and others. We nd that Nash and possibly
collusive behavior arises in the four markets we considered. These include
commercial and industrial loans, real estate loan markets, installment loan
markets, and retail time and savings markets. Our results dier markedly
from a model that does not allow for monopsony power in retail time and
savings markets.
Our results dier from those with aggregated loan markets, where the
competitive behavior in separate and independent loan markets are possibly
blurred by the aggregation of the markets. Aggregated models implicitly
assume marginal costs and demand elasticities across all loan markets are
equal. In an industry where marginal costs (i.e. loan processing and man-
agement) could dier by loan type and where, more importantly, demand
elasticities could dier, it is sensible to estimate a structural model that
dierentiates between product types, since the competitive behavior in each
market will dier according to the possibly diering demand elasticities.
Our results show that aggregation of product markets could blurred and
any inference misleading. Hence, inference obtained by using cluster mar-
kets could possibly be misleading. An analysis which uses disaggregated
market data seems to reveal more insight into the competitive nature of in-
dividual markets, which can dier dramatically as is evident by our results.
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14Table 1: Demand and Supply Equation Estimates
Demand Equations
Approx. 'T' Approx.
Variable Parameter Estimate Std Err Ratio Prob kTk
Real Estate Loans
Constant d10 -7.35 0.94 7.85 0.0001
Price d11 -8.90E-10 3.11E-10 -2.86 0.0043
Population d12 -0.00011 0.000017 -6.83 0.0001
Tbill Rate d13 -22.12 3.12 -7.09 0.0001
Discount Rate d14 12.08 3.42 3.52 0.0001
State Income d15 0.81 0.50 16.37 0.0001
Commercial and Industrial Loans
Constant d20 -8.83 0.93 9.44 0.0001
Price d21 -7.99E-9 5.16E-10 -15.47 0.0001
Population d22 -0.00011 0.000017 -6.43 0.0001
Tbill Rate d23 -23.77 3.12 -7.63 0.0001
Discount Rate d24 18.37 3.45 5.34 0.0001
State Income d25 0.89 0.049 18.03 0.0001
Installment loans
Constant d30 7.61 0.99 7.67 0.0001
Price d31 -3.33E-8 1.29E-9 -25.88 0.0001
Population d32 -0.00045 0.000019 -23.88 0.0001
Tbill Rate d33 -15.05 3.25 -4.63 0.0001
Discount Rate d34 -5.54 3.55 1.56 0.1192
State Income d35 0.63 0.051 12.34 0.0001
Bank Demand for Savings Deposit Accounts
Constant s1 -5.52 0.90 -6.16 0.0001
Price s2 -1.05E-08 1.44 -7.31 0.0001
Population s3 -0.00032 0.000018 -18.06 0.0001
Tbill Rate s4 -41.52 3.05 -13.61 0.0001
Discount Rate s5 35.06 3.44 10.20 0.0001
State Income d35 1.07 0.047 22.85 0.0001
15Table 2: Market Conduct Measures - Model 1
Approx. 'T' Approx.
Market Parameter Parameter Estimate Std Err Ratio Prob > kTk
Real Estate Loans 1 61.99 22.00 2.82 0.0049
Commercial and Industrial Loans 2 22.16 2.86 7.76 0.0001
Installment Loans 3 7.21 0.74 9.69 0.0001
Deposits  22.13 3.29 6.72 0.0001
Table 3: Market Conduct Measures - Simple Model
Approx. 'T' Approx.
Market Parameter Parameter Estimate Std Err Ratio Prob > kTk
Real Estate Loans 1 126.22 105.72 1.19 0.2327
Commercial and Industrial Loans 2 26.53 4.83 5.49 0.0001
Installment Loans 3 15.89 1.73 9.18 0.0001
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